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Abstract
This article discusses and contrasts the cultural fit, cultural potential,
communication, direction, and leadership in the success and failures of
mergers and acquisitions. The focus of the article is to determine independent
variables that influence the success or failure of a merger or acquisition
using existing empirical literature, while comparing and contrasting the
information found in ten selected case studies of successful and failed
M&As. According to one study cited, eighty-three percent of mergers and
acquisitions fail to create their intended value. The ten case studies reveal
that communication is a necessity, drastically improving the success of a
merger, and a cultural assessment of both fit and potential are important
factors for providing direction and guidance for necessary decision making
and planning initiatives required by management throughout all stages of
a merger or acquisition. The challenge for today’s business schools is to
struggle with preparing students to be effective contributors at their next
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position while simultaneously providing the grounding they need for a
lifelong career. This is not a unidimensional problem. Only when businesses
demand what they need from the B-schools will they most probably get
what they have been wishing for. The lessons from the case studies of failed
mergers tell much of the story of this disconnect.
Introduction
A study by KPMG International highlights that 83% of acquisitions
and mergers fail to create the intended value (PR Newswire, 1999).
Mergers and acquisitions are designed and executed to create growth,
competitive advantages, technological acquisition, eliminate competition
and more in order to create value. But many companies badly estimate the
complications that can arise during an acquisition, resulting in a “2+2=3”
rather than a “2+2=5” effect (Appelbaum, 2000; Cartwright and Cooper,
1993; Hovers, 1971).
While strategic, cost, revenue and legal issues drive most deals it is
cultural issues that determine their success. It is not an exaggeration that
how companies handle culture issues is probably the single most decisive
factor that can make or break a deal. Although cultural integration is of
high importance it is often hard to anticipate, analyze and quantify. It is of
no surprise that the most often quoted reason for the failure of an M&A
is culture differences. (Papadakis, 2007)
“Increased turnover, low morale, satisfaction, commitment, reduced
trust, reduced productivity, poor communication, and increase absenteeism
are all potential outcomes that can and do accompany many acquisitions”
(Nikandrou et.al., 2000). Many acquisitions have only been evaluated
based on their compatibility regarding financial figures, technological
advantages, or market share, never focusing on the soft M&A issues
(Appelbaum et.al., 2003).
People issues once were considered “soft” issues, but organizations have
learned there are hard consequences to ignoring or mismanaging people
issues during a deal. (Appelbaum et.al., 2003). Is this acquisition a good
cultural fit with ours? Do our employees have the same beliefs and values?
Is this company open minded or closed to new ideas and change? Are we
dedicating the correct amount of time to communicating our efforts and
providing the vision and direction necessary for this integration during
this acquisition?
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An equally intriguing, if not more important, issue is that management
personnel appear to lack sufficient awareness of the impact of “soft” issues
(e.g., pos-transaction workforce integration, selection and retention of specific
personnel, communications with severed and retained personnel, analysis of
the pre- and post-transaction cultural operating environment, etc.). One
can speculate from the analysis that management is either oblivious to the
importance of these issues (i.e., their ability to undermine post-transaction
strategic objectives) and/or lack the skills to incorporate interventions that
mitigate unintended consequences associated with the issues.
The purpose of this article and strategic literature review, therefore,
is to analyze cultural fit, cultural potential, and the communication, the
leadership, and the direction required in the ten selected case studies to
accommodate successful post-transaction integration and success or failure
outcomes. This review is significant in that it will directly compare suggested
necessities in successful acquisitions regarding cultural integration and
create a framework for the skills required by executives to assure success
outcomes. In terms of goals, this article has two basic purposes:
1. To examine if cultural fit, culture potential, and increased forms
of communication, direction, and leadership are present in the
review of ten case studies focused on acquisitions, and if they had
an impact on the success/failure of the outcome.
2. To examine if there are any other variables that should be
considered in future reviews.
The following section will review literature on organizational culture
and M&As. Following that will be the comparison and analysis of each
case study with regards to the information found in the literature review,
and whether or not the selected variables were present in the resulting
success or failure.
The Culture of a Company
The behavior of a company has been defined as “the specific
collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an
organization and that control the way they interact with each other and
with stakeholders outside the organization.” (Charles and Jones, 2001).
“From organizational values develop organizational norms, guidelines or
expectations that prescribe appropriate kinds of behavior by employees in
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particular situations and control the behavior of organizational members
towards one another” (Charles and Jones, 2001). This is crucial in all M&As
and one of the underpinnings of this article.
Many acquirers need to understand that in an acquisition, it is not the
assets, technology, or infrastructure that is difficult to assess and integrate
before, during, and after the takeover, but it is more the people (Feldman
and Murata, 1991). Failure to fully assess the compatibility of cultures in
the outset, the potential for compatibility in the future, is unknowingly
decreasing their success from the outset.
Research literature has deeply investigated M&As in the last two
decades. Studies have been carried out concerning several aspects of the
M&A, including remarkable efforts describing the direct relationship
between productivity and ownership change (Lichtenberg & Siegel,
1987), organizational changes and employee turnover ( Morrell et al. ,
2004) and employees’ openness and commitment to large-scale change
(Chawla & Kelloway, 2004), among others. But do M&A research
findings provide firms with the solutions needed to successfully compete
in today’s evolving market?
How can we better control and predict organizational variables such
as productivity, absenteeism, turnover, citizenship and satisfaction? These
questions impact all M&As. As research has become more available on
the soft issues related in the assessment, integration, and post-acquisition
activities of companies, it is clear that the cultural assessment of compatibility
is a must in order to improve the odds of 83% failure rate.
The cultural fit, cultural potential, communication, and direction in the
pre/during/post stages of an acquisition are very important. Cultures can
be a make-or-break factor in the merger equation. These will be examined
in the succeeding sections of this review.
Cultural Fit
Culture formation is neither a random event nor an action dependant
solely on the personalities of founders or current leaders, but it is an
internal reaction to external imperatives (Schraeder & Self, 2003). Every
organizational culture is different in style, function, rules, rewards, sanctions,
planning, structure, and policies, from one another. The assessment of
these variables between two companies is vastly important to their future
integration. Just assessing the cultural compatibility increases the odds of
successful mergers. The closer the cultural fit between the two companies,
the less adversity there will be once the acquisition begins to integrate
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(Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001). It is important to understand that the
cultural fit of two companies can be either too close to realize synergetic
improvements or too far apart to integrate without drastically negatively
impacting the integrated firms performance and the level of employee
performance/satisfaction overall.
This marriage of cultures is a very delicate exercise that affects the
employees of both organizations. Regardless of the culture that eventually
prevails, all employees will face the same experiences, such as working
with former competitors, customers or suppliers, losing their jobs or being
unhappy (Appelbaum et al 2000). Weber (1996) observes that mergers’
performance and effectiveness are inversely proportional to the differences
between the two top management teams. Managers need to integrate these
variances.
An example to further illuminate this criterion of fit is the M&A
between German-based Daimler-Benz and US-based Chrysler which
demonstrated there was little or no cultural fit (See Case #1). “Chrysler had
a reputation for having a more freewheeling, open culture, in contrast with
the more traditional, top-down management style practiced at Daimler.”
Daimler-Benz was described with words like conservative, efficient, and safe,
whereas Chrysler was seen as daring, diverse, and creative (Shelton et.al.,
2003). Nguyen and Kleiner (2003) refer to the merger of Daimler-Benz
and Chrysler as a perfect example of merger failure due to incompatible
cultures. Daimler-Benz and Chrysler operations and management could
not properly integrate because of the different approach of Germans and
Americans to work particularly administrative issues such as pay scales and
travel expenses. Ultimately, a large numbers of key Chrysler executives and
engineers resigned and Daimler-Benz employees were dissatisfied with
Chrysler division performance. In essence, it was a failure of fit.
Much of this non-cultural fit resulted in the failure of the acquisition.
The intentions of Daimler-Chrysler were admirable for technology sharing,
market growth, shared resources, but a true evaluation of cultural fit never
successfully materialized resulting in a predictable failure.
The cultural fit seeks similarities in style, leadership, direction,
communication, and organization policies. Although it is not imperative
that a company must have similar cultures, it is definitely a hurdle if they
are so very different from one another, requiring extra time, attention, and
communication in order to integrate the two.
Another critical issue in the cultural fit between the two firms is
management stylistics. If the preferences for style of management, degrees
and ways of planning, formalization, rewards and sanction modes, time
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perspectives and growth orientations point in the same direction, it is
easier to design an integrative structure than when preferences are far apart
(Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001).
Cultural Potential
The next variable to consider is the cultural potential that is the
framework in which companies operate, including cultural traits that
guide the way in which relations with other organizations and cultures are
handled (Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001).
The cultural potential of companies is an excellent barometer and
further reveals their openness to change, mainly affecting the following
traits discovered by Eiselle (1996):
1. Innovative Potential: openness to new values and ideas;
2. Trust Potential: openness to trust;
3. Mutual Dependence Potential: the mindset of two companies
working together for the greater good; and
4. Integrative Potential: the openness of a company to sorting
through issues, understanding differences, and wanting to work
through differences.
Innovative Potential
In further exploring the cultural potential of companies (Want,
2003) we can analyze the M&A between Deutsche Bank and Bankers
Trust. Deutsche looked at the innovative potential between redundant
departments in the merger of the two companies and in doing so they were
open to new ideas and ways of doing things. Furthermore, they evaluated
departments excelling between the two companies, whether it was within
Deutsche Bank or Bankers Trust, and in areas where Bankers Trust had
better employees than Deutsche Bank, it was DB employees who were
made redundant (Salama et.al., 2003).
Trust Potential
In examining the cultural potential of companies (Want, 2003) and
trust, the M&A between VW and Skoda designed the trust potential
through supporting Skoda’s company history, past accomplishments, and
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encouraging employees to take pride in being part of the new company
(Regani, 2007). This was crucial to the success of this venture and a critical
indicator of trust.
Mutual Dependence Potential
The M&A between VW and Skoda had a very high mutual dependence
potential, as VW spent much time understanding Skoda and where the
company had come from. Alternatively, Skoda was very much dedicated
to working with VW, and the two companies truly worked hand-in-hand.
VW developed many reward programs that reflected team integration
where the best ideas where kept, irrelevant of which company they derived
from (Regani, 2007)
Integrative Potential
An analysis of the cultural potential of companies to integrate effectively
reveals the M&A between Wolverhampton and Dudley Breweries
(W&DB) and Marston, Thompson & Evershed was plagued with issues
and aversive from the beginning. W&DB was seen as a cost-dominated and
hard-nose employer, implementing a destructive winner/loser mentality
among their employees. There was widespread dissatisfaction, lack of trust,
feelings of favoritism, poor communication, and jaded employees. But both
companies realized during the acquisition that issues and differences were
materializing. Almost at once a plan was derived in order to combat this
insurgence of negativity. Fairness, integrity, and transparency programs
were created. Employment assistance programs were created, social events
such as parties and family days were held, long-service and retirement
awards were created, and employee reward programs were established.
The openness of both firms to work through their differences and work
together created the integrated potential for the M&A to succeed (Pollitt,
2006). This important case was presented as an example of its significance
as a model at this point in the article but will not be one of the ten cases
examined later in the article for congruence or lack of fit with the variables
selected to evaluate the success or failure of these ventures.
Communication, Direction, and Leadership
It is difficult to separate communication, direction, and leadership,
since they are concentric. Each has their part to play in the stages of an
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acquisition, and neither can happen without the other. The direction and
leadership of a company is one thing, but in the midst of an acquisition,
a new style of leadership and direction is needed and time and effort are
further required to create open avenues of communication and information.
Acquisitions are strategically in need of a culture and leadership style of
change (Want, 2003). Some of the tactics to accomplish this include the
following.
Establish leadership quickly
Leadership is the most urgent priority when a merger closes. The
faster the top management team involved is established, the smoother the
post merger integration process will be. Empirical data demonstrates that
a significant proportion of M&As face a leadership vacuum. An example
of failed acquisitions is Nokia, the global leader in the mobile phone
business. Nokia engaged in a series of acquisitions in the 1980s and 90s
in the consumer electronics business. Their growth strategy actually failed,
and Nokia exited the business in the late 1990s. Among the main reasons
for this failure was the “management vacuum” that they experienced just
after the acquisitions.
Cisco Systems on the other hand conducted over 70 acquisitions
successfully from 1993-2000, providing a positive example on this issue.
Integration teams were formed very early in the process. Leaders appeared
to be approachable to new staff and involved themselves actively in the
whole process. A participatory style of leadership is needed (BijlismaFrankema, 2001) for employee citizenship and commitment.
Direction and Communication
Top management must help employees cope with the loss they are
experiencing to decrease the chance of M&A failure and cultural clash and
to increase employees overall adjustment (Appelbaum and Gandell, 2003).
Employees exhibit strong negative emotions upon the announcement of a
merger in terms synonymous with the death of a family member or loved
one (Schreader, 2003)
Successful mergers communicate as early as possible and as often as
possible to employees, customers, partners and the media. Cisco Systems,
for example created the “buddy system”, someone to go to during the early
days of integration, to help the employees in the acquired company feel
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at ease and an integral part of Cisco Systems. Cisco also held orientation
meetings enabling employees to ask questions and get the proper answers.
The CEO of Cisco Systems had institutionalized the motto “communicate
early, often and honestly.” Communication is one of the largest concerns
in any acquisition, but communication is also the most neglected activity
during the integration phases. Early communication and employee
involvement drastically reduced the stress and anxiety created by mergers
and acquisitions.
Nguyen and Kleiner (2003) point out that communication may be
intentionally impeded during an acquisition in order to minimize advanced
notification, which could decrease production output, increase turnover,
and even lead to a negative impact on the share price. These delays in
communication only create what they were trying to stop, increased anxiety,
stress, negatively affecting future relations and trust. Even in the cases
where management does not feel ready to communicate early on, silence
is interpreted negatively as a sign of weak leadership and unclear goals.
Employees are looking for answers to the “me” type of questions. How
does the merger affect me? What will be my role in the new organization?
Why should I sign up to the new vision and strategy?
A powerful means for quelling anxiety is stressing the elements of the
old way of doing things that are keenly preserved, as these are valued as
competing core competencies. They can serve as a bridge between the old
and the new structure and as a source of continuing pride and self-respect,
thus preserving an important function of culture throughout the change
process (Schein, 1989; Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001)
M&As should not be considered as only a legal and/or financial
transaction but rather a process in which the lives of people are affected
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1993).
Even employees who are fully willing to invest their energy in making
the new structure work often find themselves at a loss about the “hows” in
situations of unclear expectations (Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001). Clear goals
and expectations are necessary for the current and future direction of the
organization as a whole.
A vision must be clearly communicated to the new organization with
very clear lines on how and where the new company is going. Creating
the change is necessary, as companies that can change have an inherent
competitive advantage over their competition (Want, 2003). This is not as
easy as it sounds as the following cases will examine and reveal.
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Case Study Analysis
The following section of this article will include an in depth look into
ten case studies to determine if cultural fit, cultural potential, increased
communication, direction, and leadership are present and impact. Five of
the case studies are considered successful mergers, while the other five are
considered failures per the criteria and variables introduced in the review
of the literature. Why use the case study method?
Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small
number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or
generality of findings. Others feel that the intense exposure to study of the
case biases the findings. Some dismiss case study research as useful only
as an exploratory tool (Yin, 1984). Yet researchers continue to use the
case study research method with success in carefully planned and crafted
studies of real-life situations, issues, and problems.
In order to truly determine what variables influence the success or
failure of an M&A, a cross-case analysis was chosen. Our case method
approach was used in which 10 cases were chosen and then selected on
the basis of detailed information present to accurately evaluate the level
of communication, cultural fit, and level of direction/leadership within
the merger. The cases were selected based on the amount of information
present, rather than the outcome itself. It was very important that each
case focused upon the activity of an M&A and that the researcher or
author was not neglecting any of the details within the process itself.
Each case was required to possess enough information to determine
whether Cultural Fit and Cultural Potential (Innovative, Trust, Mutual
Dependence, and Integrative) existed and had an influence, while
incorporating the facets of communication, direction, and leadership
(KPMG, 1999; PR Newswire, 1999).
We have elected to use case studies, since much of the environment
within an M&A cannot be controlled and confidentiality is of the utmost
importance in such a transaction. Such real-life situations would have
been difficult to reproduce in a natural science environment unjustified by
surveys or experimental strategies. Due to these highlighted constraints,
a case study method was ultimately the only way in which we could
evaluate the variables that either created a successful or failed M&A. Each
case was evaluated on the level of communication, descriptions of each
company’s separate cultures, and typically the depth of detail regarding the
management and their decisions. Our theory generating cross-case analysis
was determined to be the only method that could effectively allow for
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the capture of cultural influences within a real-life environment that was
external to our control, while dealing with confidential information and
highly influential circumstances that could have placed the effectiveness of
this article at risk.
We recognize that the amount of information that the researchers
and author(s) of each case study included may be incomplete or limited
and possibly at times anecdotal. These case studies are focused primarily
upon the M&A activity and not necessarily the cultural influences, some
information may have been neglected or omitted due to the methodology
and unimportance attributed by the researchers in the focus of the specific
case studies. Yet, the researchers and authors of the cases used for our study,
focusing on the M&A activity itself, provided a more unbiased recount of
the situation, supporting our cross-case analysis with a clearer picture of
the said activities that lead to successful and failed opportunities to Merge
and Acquire (KPMG, 1999; PR Newswire, 1999).
We are limited to the amount of information that the researchers and
author(s) of each case study included. As these case studies are focused
upon the M&A and not necessarily culture, some information may have
been neglected or omitted due to the methodology and unimportance
attributed by the researchers in the focus of the specific case studies.
We have interpreted the findings in each case study by the level of
detail and specific levels of information for each variable. We have decided
to only report whether we felt the variables were present or not, by a positive
or negative response. We omitted what level of presence actually occurred,
as the quantification of such information was difficult to determine,
especially since the authors may not have been observing these variables or
were not cognizant they existed as factors of success or failure. If there was
no information that could be subjectively quantifiable, it was deemed as
“No information could be quantifiable.” The ten specific cases and variables
evaluated are as follows:
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Case #1: Daimler-Chrysler (Failure)
Cultural Fit:

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative
Cultural Potential:
Trust

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Communication

Direction

Leadership

Not a good one. Chrysler had a reputation for having a more freewheeling,
open culture, in contrast with the more traditional, top-down management
style practiced by Daimler. Daimler-Benz was synonymous with words like
conservative, efficient and safe. Chrysler, in contrast was known as daring,
diverse and creative.
Yes, the Germans admired the entrepreneurial spirit and innovative thinking
of the Chrysler team while Chrysler respected the engineering savvy of the
Germans.
Not much. Several of the key executives who had led Chrysler to a solid
reputation for creativity, efficiency and profitability retired early or defected
to other carmakers feeling uncertainty and trust/confidence in the new
corporation
No, this was negatively affected when Juegen Schrempp, the ex-chairman
of Daimler-Benz moved members of his German management team into key
Chrysler positions signaling the lack of intent to share the vision.
The management teams resisted to work together and were not willing to
compromise so that Daimler and Chrysler had combined not much beyond
some administrative departments, such as finance and public relations.
Components and platforms were also not shared early enough because
Mercedes-Benz executives worried their buyers might feel cheated if they
shared parts with Chrysler’s “inferior technology”.

No information could be quantifiable.

(Since the merger, DaimlerChrysler chairman Juergen Schrempp has
acknowledged in a newspaper review that the so-called merger of equals
was, in fact, a capture of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz.

No information could be quantifiable.

No information could be quantifiable.
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Case#2: Ford-Volvo (Failure)
Cultural Fit:

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative
Cultural Potential:
Trust

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

Communication

Direction

Leadership

Not compatible since Ford had a highly formal and professional approach and
Volvo was informal and flexible. At Ford, engineers are not allowed to make
decisions and all information was passed up the chain to managers, while
engineers made the decisions at all levels at Volvo.
Yes, Ford would benefit from the engineering and safety expertise of Volvo
while Volvo would benefit strategically from being part of the overall Ford
group.
No information could be quantifiable.

None. The integration phase was a long and complex affair. For example,
Ford executives would be sent to meetings knowing that they did not have
authorization to make decisions that Volvo executives would be able to do.
-The Volvo value was lost as Ford gradually imposed its formal organizational
structure on it. Volvo lost the days of speedy, flexible and “turning on a dime”
decision making as engineers were no longer authorized to make these
choices.
Not evident. As mentioned above it was Ford’s way of running the business
that took over.

No information could be quantifiable.

Ford was maneuvering Volvo into the” Ford way” of running the business.

No information could be quantifiable.
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Case #3: British Petroleum-Amoco (Success)
Cultural Fit:

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

Communication

Direction

Leadership

Different but unspecified per the investigation.

Yes. The merger managed to integrate the best practices inside each
organization. For example, the BP performance management process was
considered to be best practice in terms of generating strong performance, but
the Amoco model was used when it came to allocating capital.
Yes, since both corporations worked closely with each other to find the best
of both worlds.

Yes. The merger integrated the best practice of both sides.

Yes. An effective blend of talent from BP and Amoco was achieved at the
business-unit level so neither company dominated the merged organization.

Yes, a mini task force and project teams that included HR people were used to
integrate the two corporations with open communication.

BP encouraged employees in both corporations to socialize and work
together to break barriers.

Yes. Also close management supervision was evident.
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Case #4: Volkswagen-Skoda (Success)
Cultural Fit:

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Cultural Potential:
Integrative

Communication

Direction

Leadership

Not evident. After the Second World War (1939-1945), Czechoslovakia’s
Skoda came under the influence of Soviet Communism while Germany’s
Volkswagen was a global company. Volkswagen was known for its reliability
and quality engineering while Skoda was renowned for poor quality and lack
of innovation.
The merger managed to integrate the best practices inside each organization.
Through the nurturing integration practices of Volkswagen, Skoda was able
to transform its products and reputation into a success story.

Yes, since both corporations worked closely with each other to find the “best
of both worlds”. Volkswagen did not replace Skoda managers; it trained them
through mentoring and continuous support. In tandem management, key
management positions at Skoda were shared by one manager from VW and
another local manager for a limited period of time.
Yes. The merger integrated the best practice of both sides.

Yes. Suppliers from both corporations were used. VW also implemented
what it called Skoda Production System at the company. The system tracked
parameters like quality, costs, team cooperation and absenteeism in the
factory, and displayed this information on the shop floor. The teams with the
best results were rewarded. A common reward was a trip to one of the VW’s
other plants where the teams could benchmark Skoda’s production practices
against those of VW.

Yes, Volkswagen management worked closely with Skoda executive and
middle management. There is evidence of high levels of communications and
tolerance.

Volkswagen had a clear direction of turning Skoda into a well respected and
profitable car manufacturer.

Yes. Also close management supervision was evident.
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Case #5: Cisco-StrataCom & Cerent (Success)
Cultural Fit:

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative
Cultural Potential:
Trust

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

Communication

Direction

Leadership

No, however not specified why.

Yes, however not specifically identified in the research.

Yes, since there was minimal staff turnover in the companies acquired. This
indicated signs of trust for Cisco Systems by the employees.

Yes. Cisco learned the hard way about trying to change the practices of
companies it acquired. When it bought StrataCom, attempts to speed up sales
resulted in 30 percent of StrataCom staff leaving. When Cisco bought Cerent it
left it alone with the result that most Cerent staff is still in post. Cisco learned
to use the best of what both companies have to offer.
Cisco uses a mentoring system where Cisco veteran support an acquired
manager. This is a painless way of transferring Cisco’s values to the acquired
company, as the acquired manager will trickle them down to his staff.

Yes. A crucial part of Cisco’s merger activity is exploring how its vision and
that of the acquired company can complement each other.

Yes, Cisco holds regular employee orientation sessions where questions can
be asked and answered.
Also one of Cisco’s integration principles is “communication early, often, and
honestly”. This avoids the atmosphere of rumor and suspicion that can build
up around a fundamental business change like M&As.

Yes. Cisco over and over again demonstrated that it had set goals and
achieved them.

Yes, Cisco has made over 70 acquisitions to date and its executive owner has
been actively involved in every one.
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Case #6: Deutsche Bank-Bankers Trust (Success)
Cultural Fit:

(German culture vs. American culture was problematic.

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

Yes. Deutsche bank has been a key European competitor in the banking
industry opening new fields for Bankers Trust while Bankers trust was the
8th largest commercial bank in the United States. Bankers Trust also had a
leading edge in technology that can be very helpful for Deutsche bank.
-Transformation of Deutsche bank from a German bank into an international
organization was the challenge.

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Yes. Since Deutsche bank tried to minimize culture clashes through a culture
assessment exercise during the due diligence, trust was easy to gain. As a
result, the exercise uncovered that Bankers Trust had acquired Alex Brown
Investment Group and it was not done successfully. Employees of Alex Brown
felt that they lost their identity. To gain the trust of the employees Deutsche
bank top management decided to name the merged company in the USA,
The Deutsche Bank-Alex Brown Investment Bank.

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Yes. Bankers trust gained access to the European market and Deutsche bank
gained technological advancements.

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

The best of both worlds was implemented.

Communication

Yes. An integration team formed of key executives was in charge of closely
monitoring the merger and kept everyone well informed. The team consisted
of division heads, human resources heads and the CEO.

Direction

Yes. The development of a world leading bank was the outcome.

Leadership

Yes. There was close monitoring and control by top executives and HR.
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Case #7: Dollar-Thrifty (Failure)
Cultural Fit:

(Dollar Rent- A- Car had a power culture while Thrifty Car Rental had a
support orientation.

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

Led to a larger customer base, fleet and a stronger company

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Successful in combining two rival companies with unique and opposing
cultures without disregarding their day-to-day business.

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Memorable customer service (Thrifty) and cost savings (Dollar) assisted both.

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

Dollar Thrifty merger was a collaborative marriage featuring the identification
and implementation of best practices, synergies and shared learning from
both companies.

Communication

Employees from both companies were communicated with and served as
change agents (the culture ambassadors)

Direction

Yes. The common goal was to build a solid company with best of both worlds

Leadership

Yes. There was close monitoring and control of resources by both companies.
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Case #8: Southern Pacific Rail -Union Pacific Corporation (Failure)
Cultural Fit:

(Union Pacific had a top-down decision making predominates- that was
not a characteristic of Southern Pacific.

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

Union Pacific acquisition’s of the Southern Pacific was a traditional marriage
wherein the Union Pacific was dissatisfied with the performance of the
Southern Pacific and felt that its role was to redesign it.

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Problematic. Managers and employees of the Southern Pacific suffered
career-modifying actions when resisted.
There were problems of uncertainty, ambiguities and stress.

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

None.

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

Need to sever organizational difficulties because they took revolutionary
change and disregarded the human capital from the company it acquired.

Communication

Inadequate communication.

Direction

Yes, the goal was to take over Southern Pacific.

Leadership

Not a sharing type leadership.
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Case #9: Renault-Nissan (Success)
Cultural Fit:

No, contrasting cultures. (French and Japanese)

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

-Renault had a great know-how in small passenger cars.
-Nissan had the light commercial vehicles and large passenger cars.
-Nissan had the know-how in the manufacturing process.

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Yes. Cross training occurred and culture ambassadors were appointed from
each company.
-Nissan took stakes in Renault and vice versa to further satisfy this need.

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

Yes, the Asian Pacific market of Nissan and the European market of Renault
beneficial.

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

The best of both worlds was implemented.
Common platforms and engines appeared to be functional.

Communication

Close communication during the alliance and continuous follow-ups

Direction

Yes. The aim was to reduce Nissans debt. This occurred one year ahead of
schedule.

Leadership

Yes. There was close monitoring and control by top executives and HR.
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Case #10: Ace-Care (Two Caribbean Banks) (Success)
Cultural Fit:

None. Ace was not as customer oriented, was highly centralized, and
emphasized strict adherence to procedures. The dominant management
style was autocratic, and relationships between staff members were very
formal.
Care was quite the opposite: its branch managers enjoyed considerable
autonomy and flexibility, the dominant management style was
participatory, managers and supervisors were allowed to challenge their
seniors, relationship between members of staff was informal.

Cultural
Potential:
Innovative

Yes, Goal was to share the technology and create a bigger customer base.

Cultural Potential:
Trust

Yes due to close management supervision and communication.

Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence

The highest performing resources from both banks were left as survivors

Cultural Potential:
Integrative

The best of both worlds was implemented.

Communication

Continuous communication from management.

Direction

Yes. Given by the leaders in banking in the Caribbean.

Leadership

Yes. There was close monitoring and control by management from both
companies.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
A summary analysis suggests this particular literature review provides
insight as to the defining success and failures via activities related to
acquisitions from a cultural perspective. Researchers agree that the culture
and communication/direction/ and forms of leadership are necessary in
improving the odds of the now “famous” 83% failure rate among mergers
and acquisitions. It can be confirmed that communication is a necessity,
but it is not the defining variable. We found that the cultural assessment
including the current cultural fit and cultural potential are imperative in
improving the probability of a successful acquisition while decreasing
the negativities that are present as two unique organizational cultures are
brought together.
There is increasing evidence that cultural incompatibility is the single
largest cause of lack of projected performance, departure of key executives,
and time-consuming conflicts in the consolidation of businesses. By not
assessing a cultural fit and the cultural potential of two merging companies
and also imposing a style of management or lack thereof, only guarantees
the fate of the integration, and supports the statistics of failure regarding
M&As. Our case analyses suggests that cultural fit, cultural potential and
the increased levels of communications, direction, and leadership are all
present in the successful acquisitions, while many of these variables are
missing in the failed attempts of M&As.
The ten case studies revealed that it was not imperative to have a pure
cultural fit, but that it was very important to understand the differences in
culture between the two merging companies. The significant divergence
of cultural fit did not necessarily confirm a failure; it just indicated that
increased time, effort, and communication were required and critical to
bring the companies together. What was somewhat surprising was that
that cultural fit was not the fact that either culture is similar, but that the
acquiring company has made an assessment prior to the acquisition of the
other company, and that it understands the similarities and differences.
From that point, many companies have used this as an advantage for results
of increased communication, direction, and leadership.
Cultural potential was a necessity for many of the firms that were
deemed successful. Innovation, trust, dependence, and an integrative
potential were all key factors of success. Companies that lacked these
attributes almost always failed and it proved to be a major indication of
the success or failure of the merger or acquisition.
Communication, communication, and more communication were seen
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as the key contributing factor to success. Much of the successful case studies
highlighted the need to increase communication during the integration
phase, as this was also supported by the literature review resulting in high
congruence. Many mergers and acquisitions in the case studies raised
questions of uncertainty and concern, but much of this was abated through
constant and increased forms of communication from the leaders, managers,
and fellow employees. Leadership and direction were also key contributors to
success in acquisitions. A clear direction and lucidly articulated goals helped
the companies to focus and alleviated any anxiousness or concerns regarding
the integration and post merger syndromes.
It is very important to emphasize and note that culture should never be
confused with values, since culture is concerned with the stability, identity,
and traditions of the organization (Fralicx and Bolster, 1997). However,
these two terms do interact with and influence one another. The confusion
resulting from this issue was one of the major factors leading to the writing
of this article.
This article has closely examined and analyzed the soft issues
regarding culture, direction, leadership, and communication during a
merger or acquisition, but future research can be focused on the impact of
the acquisition regarding the cultural aspect, but using time, training, and
examining the winner/loser mentality in more depth.
Having more access to the genesis and results of M&As as they occur
would provide an increased perception of the intricacies that management
is faced with and the speed by which decisions must be made.
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